The Value of Practice

What is the value of logic? By this, I don't mean to ask what the value is to individuals who use logic, but, rather, what is it we expect from logic in the long run (like, say, over generations)? What is it of which we could always use more? I think it is safe to say that we expect of it that humanity will get better at it, that techniques for teaching and learning it will improve and spread to more people, that there will be logical progress made. Impressive logical techniques and good logical observations are things that are difficult to "discover", but, once found, aren't to be allowed to disappear from human thought, and if they do, it is a great loss.

What we have, then, appears to be a consequentialism of a sort. An action that produces more overall appreciation for logical norms is a better action than one which lessens appreciation for those norms or one that is neutral in respect to those norms. Or, at least, insofar as logic is concerned it is better. Of course, it is assumed that the norms in question are progressive, that we are using the term "norms" in the imperatival sense rather than in the descriptive sense.

As in previous posts to this blog, let's now explore what a parallelism for practical norms might be like. Just as with logic, we expect of our norms of practice/morality that humanity will get better at acting morally, that techniques for teaching and learning about morality will improve and spread to more people, that there will be moral progress made. And again, we have a consequentialism of a sort, this time aiming at actions which improve moral understanding.

None of this is very new to philosophy. One might conclude that these are merely a few of the most basic platitudes of our logical and practical thought. One might even think that the things I've been discussing on this blog are really quite far removed from morality, and are really more like pragmatics, being concerned with things that it is just good judgment to do.

The provocative idea I aim to explore is minimalism about value. Let us suppose that there is nothing more to value than what is implied by there being norms of a certain kind. The existence (or assumption) of universal standards of reasoning and speaking implies that the promotion, profligation, and improvement of those standards is valuable--logically/communicatively valuable. Similarly, the existence (or assumption) of universal standards of action implies that the promotion, profligation, and improvement of those standards is valuable--morally valuable. Any moral theory in which standards of action exist will be one in which these things are valuable. Minimalism is the idea that only these things are valuable.

So if this minimalism is right (and I think it is at least worth considering) and these are the only sources of value, then the correct value theory for our moral consequentialism isn't hedonist or utilitarian or welfarist or anything like that. Instead, the correct value theory for our moral consequentialism is an intellectualism of a sort. We are to do those actions that make us more inclined to understand morality and make us more inclined to act morally.

This may seem like a vacuous analysis, never really explaining what "morality" means, but it isn't. Just as we don't really need to define "logic" to recognize better reasoning, we don't need to define "morality" to recognize better acting. Logic just lets us make sense. Morality just lets us make good.

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I think I've now completed the very basic sketch of the minimalist-yet-complicated virtue-theoretic-yet-consequentialist theory I've introduced in this blog. In future posts, I aim to examine in more detail some of the specific aspects of the account (including the problem of how practice affects meaning--both linguistic and moral) and I also will attempt to show how this theory handles many of the standard objections to consequentialism (including most importantly, the demandingness objection) and other moral theories. Another upcoming post will be on knowledge-how, which I think can be used to positive effect on a wide range of problems in philosophy.

I also have the good fortune to be hosting an upcoming Philosopher's Carnival here at this blog, so look out for that too!